Introduction
According to the standard Walrasian (competitive) model of the labour market, where the equilibrium wage is determined through marginal productivity, two agents with identical productive characteristics necessarily receive the same wages. However, so-called compensating differences may occur between similar individuals placed in different working conditions. Indeed, the disutility undergone by one individual following the performance of a task in an unfavourable situation may lead to wage compensation. This simple description of the wage determination process has been challenged by the pioneering observations of Slichter (1950) and more recently by Dickens and Katz (1987) , Summers (1987, 1988) , and Katz and Summers (1989) . These authors demonstrated that pay differentials existed in the USA between workers with the same observable individual characteristics and working conditions employed in different sectors. Since then, similar results have been obtained for numerous industrialised countries (Araï et al., 1996; Ferro-Luzzi, 1994; Hartog et al., 1997a; Lucifora, 1993; Vainiomäki and Laaksonen, 1995) . Accordingly, the existence of sectoral effects has become an accepted fact in the economic literature. There is, moreover, general agreement on the fact that these effects are persistent, strongly correlated between countries (Helwege, 1992) and on a variable scale among the industrialised countries. Certain studies (Edin and Zetterberg, 1992; Hartog et al., 1997a; Teulings and Hartog, 1998; Zweimüller and Barth, 1994) suggest in addition that sectoral effects are significantly weaker in strongly corporatist countries.
Various reasons may explain these inter-industry wage differentials. They may, of course, reflect the fact that the non-observed individual characteristics of the employees are not distributed randomly among industries. In this case, the most well paid sectors would simply be those in which the non-observed quality of the labour force is the highest. However, they may equally stem from the specific characteristics of the employers in each sector. Gibbons and Katz (1992) support the existence of significant sectoral effects on workers' wages. Their study, relating to the USA, in fact indicates that workers changing industry claw back a significant part of the inter-industry wage differential after their move. Conversely, Goux and Maurin (1999) and Abowd et al. (1999) show that in the case of France, the nonobserved productive capacities of workers account for a substantial part of the inter-industry wage differentials. In sum, there is no consensus regarding the exact scale of the interindustry wage differentials. However, their existence highlights the influence of the characteristics of the employers in each sector on workers' wages.
Economic theories supporting the existence of an effect of the employers' characteristics on wages have proliferated over recent years (e.g. efficiency wage theory, insider-outsider theory). They provide a very interesting framework for analysis for anyone trying to gain an understanding of why, in equilibrium, two agents with identical productive characteristics, placed in the same working conditions, may be paid differently. Among these, the rent-sharing theory suggests that because of their bargaining power, unions can obtain a wage differential for their members which is greater than the competitive level. According to this theory, inter-industry wage disparities would therefore result in part from the heterogeneity of the bargaining power of the unions in the various industries.
There is a growing body of literature which confirms that the bargaining regimes which coexist within a country (e.g. the existence of unionised and non-unionised sectors) have a significant impact on inter/intra-industry wage disparities (e.g. Fortin and Lemieux, 1997; Freeman, 1980 Freeman, , 1982 Gosling and Machin, 1995; H irsch, 1982; Metcalf, 1982; Stewart, 1991) as well as wage levels. (e.g. Andrews et al., 1998; Barth et al. 1994; Booth, 1995; Dell'Aringa and Lucifora, 1994; Hartog et al., 1997b; Hildreth, 1999; Pencavel, 1991; Robinson, 1989; Robinson and Tomes, 1984; Stewart 1987) . However, it relates almost exclusively to the Anglo-Saxon countries.
In this paper we examine the role of unions in bringing about inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium. The existence of inter-industry wage differentials in the Belgian private sector has been recently highlighted by Rycx (2002) . The author shows that their structure is comparable to that observed in the other industrialised countries and that they result in part from the characteristics of the employers in each sector. Moreover, findings support the hypothesis of a negative relation between the dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials and the degree of corporatism of the industrialised countries.
The assessment of how unions affect the structure of wages in Belgium, however, is yet to be done. Unlike in the USA or Canada, the distinction between unionised and nonunionised sectors has no meaning in Belgium. The point is that virtually all workers are covered by a collective labour agreement. The bargaining regime is therefore more reflected in terms of the level of wage negotiations. We thus distinguish primarily between two types of establishments : (i) those covered only by national and/or sectoral collective agreements, and (ii) those in which wages are renegotiated collectively in house. This paper explores the following questions : (i) Can we observe inter-industry wage differentials for every bargaining regime ? (ii) Are the sectors offering high/low wages similar in the case of workers covered by different bargaining regimes ? (iii) Is the dispersion in interindustry wage differentials higher when wages are covered by a company collective agreement ? (iv) What is the wage gap between workers covered by different bargaining regimes and where does it come from ?
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows : Section 2 summarises the main features of wage bargaining in the Belgian private sector, and Section 3 describes the database. In Section 4 we present the methodology and the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
Wage bargaining in the Belgian private sector
In the countries of North America the legal provisions offer workers the possibility of voting for or against their companies' joining a union in elections supervised by the public authorities. This means that the union can earn the exclusive right to represent all the workers, whether union members or not, in bargaining with the employers. Yet as the majority of the collective agreements are negotiated at the level of the individual companies, the institutional system leads to a clear distinction between the unionised establishments, in other words those which are subject to a collective agreement, and the non-unionised establishments. Hence, the rate of unionisation provides a good approximation of the coverage rate/the bargaining regime.
In Belgium, as in the majority of European countries, the situation is very different.
The point is that wage bargaining in the Belgian private sector occurs at three levels : the national (interprofessional) level, the sectoral level and the company level. They generally occur every two years on a pyramidal basis. In principle, they are inaugurated by a national collective agreement defining a minimum level in wage terms. This national agreement can be improved within every sector of activity. Then we have the company negotiations where the sectoral collective agreements may be renegotiated, except where there is a so-called imperative clause. However, these cannot give rise to a collective agreement which would run counter to the sectoral and/or national agreements. In other words, the wage bargained at the firm level can only be greater or equal to the wage set at the national and/or industry level.
Belgium is characterised, in addition, by a coverage rate of about 90% (OECD, 1997) .
This stems from the fact that non-unionised workers, like employers not members of an employers' organisation, are generally covered by a collective labour agreement. The point is that Article 19 of the law dated 5 December 1968 specifies that a collective agreement is automatically binding upon the signatory organisations, employers who are members of those organisations or who have personally concluded the agreement, employers joining those organisations after the date of the conclusion of the agreement, and finally, all workers, whether unionised or not, who are employed by an employer so bound. Moreover, most of the sectoral collective agreements have been rendered obligatory by Royal Decree. This means that they apply compulsorily to all companies in the sector and to their workers, whether or not they are members of the signatory organisations (employers' organisations or unions).
To sum up, unlike in the USA or Canada, the bargaining regime in companies in the Belgian private sector does not derive directly from the latter's union membership. It is reflected more through the level of wage bargaining. The heart of the wage bargaining lies at the sectoral level in Belgium. However, in certain cases, sectoral agreements are renegotiated (improved) within individual companies.
Description of the database
The present study is based upon the 1995 Structure of Earnings Survey, carried out by Statistics Belgium. This survey was conducted using a representative sample of 145,107 individuals working for 6,015 establishments. It covers the Belgian establishments employing at least ten workers and whose economic activities fall within sections C to K of the Nace nomenclature. This corresponds to approximately 1,5 million workers. The survey contains a wealth of information, provided by the management of the establishments, both on the characteristics of the latter (e.g. sector of activity, region, size of the establishment, level of wage bargaining) and on the individuals working there (e.g. gender, age, experience, seniority, education, wages, number of working hours paid, occupation). The simultaneous use of data relating to wages and levels of education nevertheless yields a representative subsample of 81,562 individuals working for 4092 establishments (Demunter, 2000; Rycx, 2002) . After the exclusion of individuals for whom one of the variables used entailed a missing or incorrect observation, the number of individuals in the sample falls by approximately 2.1% to 79,835 units. Finally, the exclusive selection of establishments which are at least 50% owned by the private sector brings the sample to 67,023 individuals. This selection is justified by the fact that the wages are determined in very different ways in the public and private sectors. Taking into account establishments where economic and financial control is primarily in public hands would in fact be liable to skew our results.
In order to gain the best picture of the influence of the bargaining regime on the structure of wages in Belgium, we have split our sample into two categories. These contain the following establishments : (i) those covered only by national and/or sectoral collective agreements and (ii) those where wages are renegotiated collectively within the individual companies. Notice that the exclusion of the individuals for which this variable was badly recorded brought the definitive sample to 61,580 units.
[Take in Table I]   Table I sets out the means (standard deviations) of selected variables for the two bargaining regimes. We note a clear-cut difference between the characteristics of the firms covered by a company collective agreement and those not so covered. The point is that companies within which wages are collectively renegotiated are significantly larger, gross hourly wages are higher, workers have more seniority, the number of hours paid is greater and the proportion of workers being paid a bonus for overtime or shift work, night work and/or weekend work is higher. Conversely, the prior experience of the workers and the proportion of women is lower here. Table I shows, in addition, that 57% of the workers in the (weighted) sample are only covered by national and/or sectoral collective agreements (see Appendix A for a more detailed description).
Bargaining regimes and wage differentials
The methodology adopted to estimate inter-industry wage differentials is consistent with that of Krueger and Summers (1988) . It rests upon the estimation of the following semilogarithmic wage equation :
where w i represents the gross hourly wage of the individual i (i=1, ..., N); X is the vector of the individual characteristics of the workers and their working conditions (7 indicators showing the highest completed level of education; seniority within the current company and its square; a dummy variable controlling for entrants, i.e. individuals with no seniority; prior experience, its square and its cube; sex; number of hours paid; a dummy for extra paid hours; 23 occupational dummies; 2 regional dummies indicating where the establishment is located; Technically, the computation of inter-industry wage differentials first of all involves calculating the average wage differential of all the sectors compared to the reference :
where,
and then applying the formulae below :
The standard deviation of the inter-industry wage differential ( d k 's), adjusted for sampling error and weighted by the sectoral employment shares (further referred in the text as WASD, i.e. weighted adjusted standard deviation) is computed as follows :
Inter-industry wage differentials per bargaining regime
Table II presents the inter-industry wage differentials and their dispersion for a Nace two-digit nomenclature (see Appendix B for the estimates of the wage equations) [1] . Results show that for every bargaining regime, wage differentials exist between workers employed in different sectors, even after controlling for individual characteristics, working conditions and firm size.
These differentials are significant both in individual terms (with the exception of one sector) and globally at the 5% threshold. We further note that the hierarchy of the sectors in terms of wages is similar to the one we obtain for the aggregate sample. Among the best paid sectors we find : electricity, gas steam and hot water supply; financial intermediaries (excluding insurance and pension funding); post and telecommunications; and manufacture of coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel. Furthermore, it is in the traditional sectors (hotels and restaurants, the textile industry and retailing), that wages are lowest.
[Take in Table II] The hypothesis according to which the hierarchy of the wage differentials is similar for both bargaining regimes is confirmed by Table III . In fact we see that the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between the wage differentials estimated for each bargaining regime reach almost 0.700, with a probability of being zero of less than 1%.
[Take in Table III] This result underlines the existence of a sectoral effect on the workers' wages, irrespective of the bargaining regime considered. In other words, the sectors offering high/low wages are similar for workers covered by different bargaining regimes. This is explained by the relative homogeneity of the organisational and technological characteristics of the establishments within each sector of activity. In addition, this result might be due to a phenomenon of mimetism (Dickens, 1986) : companies in which wages are not renegotiated collectively might be patterning their wage policy on those which do operate such an arrangement, in order to attract the best workers, to show their staff that they are being treated fairly and to curb the rate of manpower rotation.
Dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials
Should we infer from these results that the bargaining regime has no influence on the structure of wages in a corporatist country ? The analysis of the dispersion of the inter-industry wage differentials refutes this hypothesis. Table II This result needs to be analysed in more detail. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that collective renegotiation of wages at the firm level intensifies the correlation between the economic situation of the establishments (e.g. productivity, market share, prices) and the level of wages therein. Hence, we would expect the dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials to be wider among firms covered a company collective agreement.
Where does this puzzle come from ? Table IV presents the top and bottom 10 sectors according to their wage differentials (after controlling for individual characteristics, working conditions and firm size). It shows also the proportion of workers solely covered by national and/or sectoral collective agreements within these sectors.
[Take in Table IV] If we explore Table IV , we note that in the high-wage sectors (e.g. post and telecommunications; electricity, gas steam and hot water supply; water transport; manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel) and even more in the low-wage sectors (e.g. retail trade; manufacture of wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur; hotels and restaurants; manufacture of textiles) most workers are solely covered by national and/or sectoral collective agreements. To put it differently, workers whose wages are covered by a company collective agreement appear to be more concentrated in sectors offering relatively homogeneous wage premiums. As a result, Table IV suggests that it is because of the asymmetrical sectoral distribution of employment shares ( k p ) in both sub-sample of firms, that the WASD of inter-industry wage differentials is found to be lower when wages are renegotiated at the firm level.
This explanation is backed up and took further by (i) The standard deviation of the inter-industry wage differentials prior to weighting (and adjustment) is significantly higher when wages are renegotiated at the firm level.
(ii) The WASD of the inter-industry wage differentials among the firms covered by a company collective agreement would have been larger than in those not so covered, if the distribution of sectoral employment had been the same as in the latter.
[Take in Table V] In sum, although we found that the WASD of inter-industry wage differentials is smaller when wages are covered by a company collective agreement, Table V shows that the reverse result would have appeared if the distribution of sectoral employment had been the same across bargaining regimes.
It is not easy to compare our results against those of other studies, because the latter relate essentially to the Anglo-Saxon countries and therefore refer to very different industrial relations systems. Be that as it may, the litterature do show that the unions significantly reduce the inter-industry and inter/intra-establishment wage differentials (Fortin and Lemieux, 1997; Freeman, 1980 Freeman, , 1982 Gosling and Machin, 1995; Hirsch, 1982; Metcalf, 1982; Stewart, 1991) . Our results corroborate these findings, for they illustrate that, ceteris paribus, the dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials is higher when collective bargaining is more decentralised.
Wages levels
What about the influence of the bargaining regime on the level of wages ? To answer this question, we have applied the decomposition procedure developed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) , who showed that the difference between the average hourly wage (in logarithms) of workers covered by a different bargaining regime can be broken down as follows : We have chosen as a non-discriminatory wage structure that of the workers (solely) covered by a n ational and/or sectoral collective agreement. This choice is justified by the following facts : (i) the heart of the collective bargaining is at the sectoral level in Belgium;
(ii) this bargaining regime covers the greatest number of individuals. We thus arrive at the following equation :
where the indices c and s respectively identify the workers covered by a company collective agreement and those not so covered. The left-hand term in equation (6) [Take in Table VI ] [Take in Table VII] In an international perspective, our results support the hypothesis that the sens itivity of wages to the bargaining regime is significantly lower in corporatist countries [4] . Indeed, as shown in Table VII , the estimated union -non union wage gap is over 20% in Canada (Robinson, 1989; Robinson and Tomes, 1984) , between 15 and 17% in Australia (Christie, 1992) and approximately 15% in the USA (Booth, 1995; Pencavel, 1991) . The studies on the UK, for their part, reveal the existence of a union wage gap which stands at between 8 and 12% (Andrews et al., 1998 ) with sizeable differences depending on the bargaining regime considered (Stewart, 1987) .
The results in the case of continental Europe are rarer. Dell'Aringa and Lucifora (1994), however, report a union wage gap of 4.4% for unskilled workers and 7.5% for skilled workers in the metal-mechanical industry in Italy. In the Netherlands this effect would be smaller than 5% (Hartog et al., 1997b) . Finally, according to Barth et al. (1994) , Norwegian workers covered by a company collective agreement would, all other things being equal, earn 7.5% more than their opposite numbers (solely) covered by a national collective agreement.
Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the role of unions in bringing about inter-industry wage differentials in the Belgian private sector. Unlike in the countries of North America, the distinction between unionised and non-unionised firms has no meaning in Belgium. The point is that virtually all workers are covered by a collective labour agreement. The bargaining regime is therefore more reflected in terms of the level of wage bargaining. We thus distinguish between two types of establishments : (i) those solely covered by national and/or sectoral collective agreements, and (ii) those in which wages are collectively renegotiated at the firm level.
The empirical evidence reported in this paper emphasises the existence of a sectoral effect on workers' wages, irrespective of the bargaining regime considered. In other words, we found that sectors offering high/low wages are similar for workers covered by different bargaining regimes, even when controlling for individual characteristics, working conditions and firm size. This result is explained by the relative homogeneity of the organisational and technological characteristics of the establishments within each sector of activity. In addition, it might be due to a phenomenon of mimetism (Dickens, 1986) : companies in which wages are not renegotiated collectively might be patterning their wage policy on those which do operate such an arrangement, in order to attract the best workers, to show their staff that they are being treated fairly and to curb the rate of manpower rotation.
Nevertheless, our findings do show that the bargaining regime has a significant impact upon the structure of wages in Belgium. Indeed, we note that, ceteris paribus, the dispersion of inter-industry wage differentials is higher when wages are covered by a company collective agreement. This finding is in line with other studies (Fortin and Lemieux, 1997; Freeman, 1980 Freeman, , 1982 Gosling and Machin, 1995; Hirsch, 1982; Metcalf, 1982; Stewart, 1991) which suggest that inter/intra-industry wage differentials are higher when wage setting is more decentralised. Moreover, our results indicate that the bargaining regime has a significant influence on the level of wages and that, ceteris paribus, workers covered by a company collective agreement earn 5.1% more than their opposite numbers who are (solely) covered by national and/or sectoral collective agreements. In an international perspective, this finding supports the hypothesis that the sensitivity of wages to the bargaining regime is significantly lower in corporatist countries.
Future research concerning the impact of the bargaining regime on inter-industry wage differentials in the Belgian private sector should rely on a longitudinal database in order to control for the non observed individual characteristics of the workers. Indeed, these characteristics might modify our results if it emerged that they were not distributed randomly between sectors and/or bargaining regimes. Unfortunately, at the moment such database does not exist. In addition, future analysis should try to control for a potential firm selectivity effect, i.e. for the fact that firms in a particular bargaining regime might not be representative of the overall sample of firms. However, as pointed out by Hartog et al. (1997b: 7) , this will remain a very difficult task "as long as no (satisfactory) independent variables to control for the endogeneity of the bargaining regime are available".
Notes
1. An identical analysis was carried out for three-digit industries. The results arising from this, available on request, support and refine our conclusions.
2. This result is supported by an analysis carried out for three-digit industries.
3. Similar results were found for three-digit industries. 1 CA means collective (wage) agreement. All the estimates are at least significant at the level of 5%, except those in bold. They were estimated from a wage equation including the vectors X (individual characteristics and working conditions), Y (43 sectoral dummies) and Z (size of the establishments). Notes : The inter-industry wage differentials have been estimated from the aggregate sample controlling for individual characteristics, working conditions and firm size (see Table 1 , column 1). Hartog et al. (1997b) .
d : Own calculations (see Table VI ). e : Dell'Aringa and Lucifora (1994) .
f : Barth et al. (1994) . g : Andrews et al. (1998 ), Stewart (1987 . h : Booth (1995) and Pencavel (1991) .
i : Christie (1992) . j : Robinson (1989) and Robinson and Tomes (1984) . 
